



**Director of  
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UGANDA: Increasing Instability

*Divisions within the Ugandan leadership are intensifying as Tanzania prepares to begin withdrawing up to half of its 20,000 troops from Kampala and northern Uganda by the end of the month.*

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Many of the newly trained Ugandan forces that are to replace the Tanzanians are controlled by rivals of Ugandan President Binaisa. Leaders of Binaisa's southern Baganda tribe, which has few recruits in the embryonic Army, evidently are seeking arms to protect themselves in the event of clashes with rival tribal groups after the Tanzanians leave. The Army high command's reported decision to keep the new Ugandan troops in the north and away from Kampala could reduce the danger of clashes.

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Some of Binaisa's many rivals in the quasi-legislative National Consultative Council are seeking to vote him out of office because of his failure to consult them on cabinet changes and other important issues. They have been unable to remove him, however, because they cannot agree on a successor. Nonetheless, their maneuvering is paralyzing the government and has destroyed the coalition that formed when Idi Amin was ousted last year.

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## KAMPUCHEA: Khieu Samphan's Travels

*Democratic Kampuchean Prime Minister Khieu Samphan's efforts to promote broad regional support for his "new" government have not fared well.* [redacted] 25X1

Samphan, who replaced Pol Pot as Prime Minister last December, has been unable to complete a projected Asian tour. Although Samphan visited China and North Korea earlier this month, Japan and the Philippines denied him entry. [redacted] 25X1

The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations formally back Democratic Kampuchea's UN membership because they oppose Vietnam's aggression in Kampuchea. They want, however, to maintain strict separation between this principle and the personalities in a leadership closely associated with past atrocities. [redacted] 25X1

Only the Chinese gave Samphan a warm reception during his visit to Beijing. They nevertheless avoided endorsing him unequivocally as their choice for leader of Kampuchea and instead stressed the need to create a broadly based front against Vietnam. [redacted] 25X1

North Korea, apparently in deference to China, agreed to receive Samphan but accorded him only minimal fanfare during his three-day visit. He returned to Beijing on Friday and plans to continue on to Kampuchea on an undisclosed date. [redacted] 25X1

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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: Reaction to US Grain Embargo

*Despite agreement among developing countries that food embargoes should not be used as political weapons in international disputes, Third World reaction to the US embargo of grain to the USSR has been surprisingly low key.* [redacted] 25X1

At the UN, resolutions affirming the freedom to acquire food as a human right have received overwhelming support from developing countries, particularly in the World Food Council. The problem of world hunger will be one of the focal points of coming negotiations between industrial and developing countries. [redacted] 25X1

The Third World sees the current US embargo, however, as a bilateral superpower dispute. Because food was excluded from possible US economic sanctions against Iran, developing countries apparently believe Washington will not use food embargoes indiscriminately against Third World countries. Brazil and Thailand--net food exporters--have even made statements supporting the US action against the Soviets. [redacted] 25X1

A number of developing countries benefited from the US action. Several countries increased purchases of US grain after prices dropped. Bangladesh and Jamaica hoped Washington would make more food aid or PL480 credits available as a result of the embargo. [redacted] 25X1

Mexico and Argentina were the only developing countries that issued public statements reiterating their opposition to the use of food as a foreign policy tool. The Mexicans, however, never linked their position directly to US actions, perhaps because they opted to buy at least 1 million tons of the surplus grain. Argentina, which did criticize the sanctions publicly, has lost customers to the US because of the US surplus of lower priced grain that resulted from the embargo. As a result, it is left having to sell greater than expected amounts of grain to the Soviets. [redacted] 25X1

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IRAN: Election Results

President Bani-Sadr's supporters are continuing to fare poorly in the legislative elections. In Tehran, where 30 seats are at stake, 13 candidates have won first-round victories. Four are members of the hardline Islamic Republic Party, two are independents who oppose Bani-Sadr, one supports the radical Mujahedin, and four are independents with no known ties to either the President or his opponents. Only two winners in the capital are likely to back Bani-Sadr in the Assembly. National results may not be announced until after the New Year holidays which start on Friday; widespread charges of irregularities and fraud may further postpone a final counting.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

IRAN: Recent Communist Activity

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*While the weak central government remains preoccupied with the hostage crisis, pro-Soviet political groups continue to expand their influence in Iran. The Iranian Communists are still far from ready to challenge Ayatollah Khomeini directly, but they are working their way into increasingly stronger positions.*

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Moscow probably sees its best option for now as one of attempting to curry favor with the current regime and of encouraging its anti-Western stance.

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The pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh (Masses) Party operates openly and portrays itself as the junior partner in a coalition with Khomeini--almost certainly with Moscow's endorsement or direction. The Ayatollah, who is strongly anti-Communist, appears willing to tolerate the Tudeh as long as it backs him and he judges it to be weak. President Bani-Sadr has become increasingly critical of Tudeh activities and is apparently more inclined to crack down on the party, although he has not yet taken any significant steps against it.

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Estimates of Tudeh membership range from less than 5,000 to 35,000. The party has little mass appeal because of its well-known subservience to Moscow. It reportedly has had some success, however, in recruiting new members among its traditional target groups of students and oil workers. The Tudeh also may have recruited some junior military officers and created a clandestine organization in the military.

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At this point, the Tudeh could probably come to power only if the government collapsed or if the party led a military takeover along the lines of the coup in Afghanistan in April 1978. To survive, a Tudeh regime would require massive Soviet support, including military intervention.

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Iran's other leftist parties--the Islamic Mujahedin guerrillas and the Marxist Fedayeen--have consistently rebuffed Tudeh offers to form a broad national coalition. Both groups claim to be independent of Moscow, but both probably have been infiltrated to some extent by Tudeh supporters. In any case, both operate closely with the various minority groups and contribute to keeping the Tehran government weak and off balance.

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Involvement with Minorities

Regime officials suspect that the Soviets are deeply involved in ethnic dissidence throughout Iran, despite Soviet and Tudeh declarations that they favor peaceful resolution of Iran's ethnic conflicts. All of the leading ethnic dissident groups are leftist, leftist allies, or vulnerable to leftists. The best organized have long had contacts with the USSR or its intermediaries.

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Iranian officials are also concerned that the Soviets may be increasing their activities among the Baluchis in southwestern Iran. We have no direct evidence of such activity, but several Baluchi dissident groups have long had contacts with the Soviets and are likely to seek aid from the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

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